Platform Crises Are Contagious: A 4-Week Tmon-WeMakePrice Response Record

In July 2024, Tmon and WeMakePrice stopped making settlement payments.

Initially it looked like a simple liquidity issue. Within days, the situation transformed. Hundreds of billions of won in unpaid obligations surfaced; sellers found themselves unable to issue refunds; consumers lined up in front of offline stores unable to get their money back. "Can we trust e-commerce platforms?" became a societal question.

Ohouse is an e-commerce platform. We sell interior products — not the same category as Tmon and WeMakePrice — but in consumers' eyes, we belong to the same bucket.

Crisis Spreads Even When You Didn't Cause It

In PR, the most dangerous crisis is the situation where "anxiety spreads to us even when we've done nothing wrong." Ohouse had an entirely different structure from Tmon and WeMakePrice. Our direct-sale ratio was higher; our settlement system was different. The particular problem was an accounting illusion caused by RCPS (redeemable convertible preferred stock): converting to K-IFRS standards ahead of an IPO surfaced liabilities that hadn't shown up before, leaving room for misunderstanding. But the facts were clear.

But fighting on facts alone sometimes loses. Anxiety spreads faster than facts. Four separate actors were moving at four different speeds: journalists' perceptions, political movements, sellers' anxiety, and consumer community sentiment.

Four-Scenario Design

Immediately after the crisis broke, the communications team analyzed the situation and divided the risks we might face into four axes.

The first was journalists. Reporters had a real possibility of expanding their coverage to target all e-commerce platforms. We needed to build our message before the question "is Ohouse okay?" started arriving.

The second was politics. E-commerce regulation tightening could accelerate using this incident as a catalyst. National Assembly audit season was approaching. We needed to watch policy direction closely and respond actively if necessary.

The third was sellers. Our partner businesses would definitely be anxious. Clear communication about our settlement structure and safety was required. Silence makes anxiety grow.

The fourth was consumer communities. If "isn't Ohouse also dangerous?" started circulating in online communities, it would quickly become uncontrollable. Early suppression was critical.

Building the TF and Writing the Script

We assembled a risk task force. Legal, CS, and communications — three functions with different roles.

Legal laid out the structural differences between Tmon-WeMakePrice and Ohouse precisely: settlement method, escrow structure, liquidity risk assessment — the RCPS-driven illusion versus our company's actual financial soundness. This was the factual foundation for everything we'd say to journalists.

CS tracked consumer inquiry patterns in real time. "Aren't you going to be like Tmon-WeMakePrice?" was actually coming in. We built a standard response manual quickly.

Communications designed scenario-by-scenario messaging: responses for when journalists asked, notices to go out to sellers, language for consumer-facing channels. Each required a different tone and intensity.

Making "Ohouse Is Safe" Into News

Simply saying "we're fine" is hollow. For it to become news, there needed to be evidence — and the timing of delivery had to be right.

The approach we chose was pre-briefing. We contacted key economics and IT journalists proactively to explain our structure. Not asking for coverage — sharing background "so you can report accurately if there are inquiries." As a former journalist myself, I knew exactly how this works. Journalists trust companies that prepare context in advance over companies that scramble to issue a statement after a story breaks.

Even with preparation, what's going to come out comes out. A major outlet published a piece scrutinizing the company's financial health — triggered by the surge in liabilities that appeared when we converted redeemable convertible preferred stock (RCPS) to K-IFRS accounting standards.

We explained, we clarified, we issued corrections — but a fire once lit doesn't go out easily. We produced explanatory press materials and went around to major outlets in person to clarify the facts.

Some of it was genuinely difficult to understand without a financial specialist background. And even though investors all understood the situation, once an article runs it's hard to walk it back.

Various explanatory articles and clarifications followed — coverage explaining that the company had no financial problems whatsoever — but seller anxiety continued to ripple outward.

It took the CFO giving a press interview, a review under standard corporate accounting principles, and even the arrangement of insurance before things finally calmed down to an acceptable degree.

About four weeks in total. A media frame that shook the company had taken hold in an instant.

The One Thing a Journalist-Turned-PR Practitioner Does Differently

What I felt most strongly through this experience was the importance of "reading the board."

During my years as a journalist, I absorbed — in my body, not just my head — how issues spread, how reporters approach their angles, and when politicians jump on which issues. Working as a PR professional, the moment that experience applied most directly was the Tmon-WeMakePrice crisis.

Crisis management is ultimately an information war. Seeing how things will develop before others do, and moving first. Blocking the paths through which crisis spreads before they open. And delivering facts through the right channels at the right time.

That said — even with all the preparation, there are times when unexpected stories break and you're scrambling to respond.

But when the fire comes, becoming the firefighter is PR's calling.

The Tmon-WeMakePrice crisis taught me a great deal.